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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1) Nature of the Case. 
This is a contract case. 
The contract contained a procedure for claiming additional payment and it contained an 
arbitration clause. Respondent Debco Construction ("Debco") demanded arbitration. 
The Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") filed a declaratory judgment suit, alleging 
that contractual (not statutory; not regulatory) conditions precedent to arbitration had not been 
satisfied. ITD sought an order preventing Debco from pursuing arbitration until the alleged 
contractual conditions precedent to arbitration were satisfied. 
The case was dismissed below, the District Court finding that questions of procedural 
arbitrability are for the arbitrators, not the courts. 
2) The Course of Proceedings Below. 
On December 10, 2013, ITD filed its complaint soliciting declaratory and injunctive 
relief. (R., Vol. I, p. 000005). ITD withdrew its request for injunctive relief prior to dismissal of 
its complaint. (R., Vol. I, p. 000466). The declaratory action remained. 
ITD prayed for "declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the contract's 
administrative claims process prior to pursuing arbitration." (Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment & Injunctive Relief, p. 10, Item #1; R., Vol. I, p. 000014). 
Debco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on January 17, 2014, asserting that the 
procedural arbitrability question presented by ITD was for the arbitrators. (R., Vol. I, pp. 
000154- 155). 
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On February 21, 2014, after briefing and argument, Judge Hippler granted the motion to 
dismiss (R., Vol. I, p. 000468), and entered judgment against ITD " ... on all claims asserted 
against Defendant in Plaintiffs complaint." (R., Vol. I, p. 000469). 
ITD did not file a motion to amend its complaint. 
The customary memorandum of costs was filed. (R., Vol. I, p. 0004 72). After hearing and 
briefing, costs and fees were awarded to Debco. (R., Vol. I, p. 000516). 
3) A Concise Statement of Facts. 
This is an appeal from the grant of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. For convenience, a 
marked-up copy of the text of the Complaint, complete with page numbers assigned in the 
Clerk's record, is attached as Appendix "A". 
ITD filed its Complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on December 10, 
2013. (R., Vol. I, p. 000005). ITD asserted that the pat1ies entered into a contract containing 
both an administrative claims process and an arbitration clause. (Complaint, iJifl2-14; R., Vol. I, 
p. 000008). ITD asserted that Debco failed to exhaust the contractual administrative claims 
process prior to demanding arbitration (Complaint, i)35; R., Vol. I, p. 000012). 
ITD alleged that it was " ... entitled to enforce contract provisions related to the 
administrative claims process." (Complaint, i)37; R., Vol. I, p. 000012; emphasis added). On its 
declat·atory count, ITD requested that the court "declare the appropriate interpretation of the 
contract, and ... enforce Debco's obligation to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to 
commencing arbitration" (Complaint, iJ42; R., Vol. I, p. 000013; emphasis added). 
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ITD further sought injunctive relief prohibiting Debco from pursuing the arbitration 
" ... unless and until Debco completes the contractual administrative claims process." (Complaint, 
,r,r45-46; R., Vol. I, p. 000013 -14; emphasis added). 
On January 17, 2014, Debco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). (R., Vol. I, p. 000015). Debco posited that "[q]uestions of procedural 
arbitrability" ... such as whether conditions precedent to arbitrate have been met " ... are for the 
arbitrators to decide." Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 412, 224 P.3d 468, 
4 79 (2009). (R., Vol. I, p. 000016). 
While it does not bear on the issue presented, it may offer perspective to observe that the 
timing of Debco's arbitration demand was not without logic. As provided within the exhibits to 
ITD's complaint, Debco's arbitration demand asserted (a) that an independent technical expert 
jointly hired by the parties had concluded that Debco was without fault, (b) that the independent 
expert had found that ITD had "deliberately" misrepresented matters provided in its report, and 
( c) that an independent Dispute Review Board had found that Debco was entitled to payment; 
still Debco was not paid and it was crippling the small company. (See generally, Complaint 
Exhibit "F"; R., Vol. I, p. 000060-62). Debco had soundly briefed the propositions: (a) that the 
arbitration clause did not contain an effective condition precedent to arbitration, (b) that contract 
constructional rules strongly favored arbitrability of the dispute, and (c) that ITD's material 
breach obviated compliance with any hypothetical condition precedent. (See, e.g., Debco's Brief 
in Support of Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment; R., Vol. I, p. 000297). But Debco 
did not ask Judge Hippler to decide the merits of these propositions. 
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Debco simply asserted that ITD's questions of procedural arbitrability are quite clearly 
for the arbitrators to decide, not the court. (Debco's Reply Brief on Motion to Dismiss; R., Vol. I, 
p. 000428). ITD's complaint had focused solely on whether Debco had satisfied procedural 
conditions precedent to arbitration. (See, Complaint, ,r,r 20, 35, 37, 42, 45, and 46; R., Vol. I, p. 
000009-14). 
Prior hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, ITD withdrew its claims for injunctive relief. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 000466). As explained by ITD, the Arbitration Panel had declined to schedule an 
arbitration hearing until the contract administrative claims process was complete, so there was no 
need for an injunction. (See Appellant's Brief, p.3). 
Following argument, Judge Hippler granted Debco's Motion to Dismiss. ITD had 
acknowledged that only a contract question was presented and not a "statutory administrative 
remedy process." (R., Vol. I, p. 000424). During argument, ITD had acknowledged that its 
complaint presented only a question of whether conditions precedent to arbitration had been 
satisfied. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 17, LL. 5-22). ITD had also acknowledged that if case law was properly 
read so as to vest the arbitrators with authority to decide questions of procedural arbitrability, the 
declaratory judgment act affords no basis to circumvent the rule. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 19, L. 13 p. 20, 
L. 7). 
ITD did not seek to amend its complaint to allege anything other than its contract-based 
declaratory action, praying "for declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the 
contract's administrative claims process prior to pursuing arbitration" and "for declaratory 
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judgment ordering Debco to suspend the AAA arbitration unless and until Debco exhausts the 
administrative claims process." (Complaint, Items #1 and #2 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000014). 
5 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1) Did ITD's Complaint state a cause of action under which relief could be granted 
by the District Court? 
2) Did ITD move to amend its Complaint in any respect, or to plead a cause of 
action under the Administrative Procedures Act? 
3) Should Debco be awarded cost and fees on appeal pursuant to LC. Section 12-
120(3), LC. Section 12-121, or LC. Section 12-117? 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ITD had already withdrawn its request for injunctive relief by the time this case was 
dismissed. 
The only declaratory relief sought in paragraph 42 of the Complaint was " ... to declare the 
appropriate interpretation of the contract in ITD's favor, and enforce Debco's obligation to 
exhaust the administrative claims process prior to commencing arbitration." (R., Vol. I, p. 
000013). The prayer merely sought a "declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the 
contract's administrative claims process" and a "declaratory judgment ordering Debco to 
suspend the AAA arbitration unless and until Debco exhausts the administrative claims process." 
(Complaint, Items #1 and #2 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000014). 
ITD's complaint patently presented a contractual question of procedural arbitrability. 
Indeed, the proposition presented by ITD is nearly identical to that dispatched on rehearing in 
Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 411-413, 224 P.3d 468, 478-480 (2009). 
ITD did not ask to amend its complaint. ITD instead advised the District Court: (a) that 
it presented a contractual issue, and was not relying on a "statutory administrative process"; (b) 
that ITD had presented a question of whether contract conditions prior to arbitration had been 
satisfied; and ( c) that the declaratory judgment act added nothing to the analysis if Storey 
Construction was properly read to vest the arbitrators with authority to decide questions of 
procedural arbitrability. 
Newly developed arguments as to the applicability of the Administrative Procedures Act 
( a) were not pled below; (b) were disclaimed below; and ( c) are substantively misplaced. The 
7 
legislature has not empowered ITD with administrative authority to decide its own contract 
disputes, and the claims resolution provisions in ITD's contract are neither "Rules" as defined in 
the Act nor found within IDAP A. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
1) The Standard of Review. 
a) Dismissal of the Complaint. 
Dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 242 P. 3d 642, 648 (2010). After viewing all the facts and 
inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim 
for relief has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 
whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Id., ( citing Losser v 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008)). 
b) Attorney Fees. 
Whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies to a given set of facts is a question of 
law. Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 586, 226 P.3d 524, 528 (2010) (citing 
Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., 143 Idaho 641,644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 (2006)). 
2) ITD's Contract Complaint did not State a Cause of Action Under Which 
Relief Could be Granted by the District Court. 
a) What Cause of Action Was Pied? 
ITD's Complaint, focused narrowly on questions of procedural arbitrability, and was 
styled as one for "Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief." (R., Vol. I, p. 000005). ITD pled 
the existence of a contract containing both an administrative claims process and an arbitration 
clause. (Complaint, ,r,rll-20; R., Vol. I, p. 000007-10). ITD alleged that Debco had improperly 
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filed arbitration prior to completion of the contract administrative process (R., Vol. I, p. 000010-
11). 
ITD asserted that it was " ... entitled to enforce the contract provisions pertaining to the 
administrative claims process." (Complaint, 137; R., Vol. I, p. 000012). 
Count One of the Complaint sought "Declaratory Judgment" and Count Two sought a 
"Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction" (R., Vol. I, p. 000013). Except perhaps as to the 
immediate effect of a restraining order, there was no practical difference between the requested 
declaratory and injunctive remedies. 
Under Count One, " .. .ITD request[ed] that this Court issue a Declaratory Judgment in 
ITD's favor to declare the appropriate interpretation of the contract, and to enforce Debco's 
obligation to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to commencing arbitration." 
(Complaint, 142; R., Vol. I, p. 000014). The prayer of the Complaint sought " ... declaratory 
judgment ordering Debco to comply with the contract's administrative claims process prior to 
pursuing arbitration" (Complaint, Item # 1 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 15), and " ... declaratory 
judgment ordering Debco to suspend the AAA arbitration unless and until Debco exhausts the 
administrative claims process." (Complaint, Item #2 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000015). 
Under Count Two, ITD (seeking both a TRO and a Preliminary Injunction) requested that 
the Court " .. .issue an injunction to enJom Debco and anyone acting on its behalf from 
prosecuting an arbitration demand unless and until Debco completes the contractual 
administrative claims process." (Complaint, 146; R., Vol. I, p. 000015). The prayer of the 
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Complaint sought " ... an injunction to enjoin Debco from pursuing arbitration absent completion 
of the administrative claims process." (Complaint, Item #4 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000015). 
As a practical matter, the declaratory and injunctive counts were indistinguishable 
ITD withdrew its request for injunctive relief prior to the hearing on Debco's motion to 
dismiss ITD' s complaint. (R., Vol. I, p. 000466). 
b) Questions of Procedural Arbitrability are For the Arbitrators. 
For five years now it has been settled law that questions of procedural arbitrability are for 
the arbitrators. Storev Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 411-413, 224 P.3d 468, 478-
480 (2009). The question presented now was squarely addressed then. 
Mr. Storey had asserted that the Court (not the arbitrators) should decide whether a 
contract administrative procedure was a condition precedent to arbitration and whether that 
procedure had been satisfied. Storev Construction, supra at 411-412. The contract in question in 
Storev Construction contained a provision requiring claims to first be submitted to an architect 
for review prior to arbitration. Storev Construction, supra, at 411-412, n.7. ITD's contract 
provision is strikingly similar, contemplating that claims may be submitted to the engineer for 
review. (Complaint, Exhibit "C"; R., Vol. I, pp. 000033-34). 
The Storev Construction Comi dispatched the procedural issue in favor of arbitration, 
addressing the subject as follows: 
"Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court. " Mason v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 (2007). However, 
courts, including this Court, have limited the scope of the question of arbitrability. The 
vast majority have held that issues of procedural arbitrability, such as whether 
conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators 
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to decide. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 US. 79, 84-85, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592, 154 L.Ed2d 491, 497-98 (2002): 
Thus " 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final 
disposition" are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide. 
John Wiley [& Sons, Inc. v. Livingston[, supra, [376 US. 543] at 557, 84 S.Ct. 
909[, 918, 11 L.Ed2d 898, 909 (1964)] (holding that an arbitrator should decide 
whether the first two steps of a grievance procedure were completed, where these 
steps are prerequisites to arbitration). So, too, the presumption is that the 
arbitrator should decide "allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability. "Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital [v. Mercury Construction, 
Corp.[, supra, [460 US. l] at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927[, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 785 
(1983)]. Indeed, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA), seeking to 
"incorporate the holdings of the vast majority of state courts and the law that has 
developed under the [Federal Arbitration Act]," states that an "arbitrator shall 
decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled" RUAA § 
6(c), and comment 2, 7 UL.A. 12-13 (Supp.2002). And the comments add that "in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues of substantive arbitrability ... 
are for a court to decide and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether 
prerequisites such as time limits, notice, !aches, estoppel, and other conditions 
precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to 
decide. " Id., §6, comment 2, 7 UL.A., at 13 (emphasis added). 
Although this Court has not addressed whether issues of procedural arbitrability, 
such as a condition precedent, should be decided by the arbitrators or the court, having 
the arbitrators decide it would be consistent with our precedents. 
"This Court has recognized a strong public policy which favors arbitration. 
Agreements to arbitrate are encouraged and given explicit recognition as effective means 
to resolve disputed issues. "Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 
201, 177 P.3d 944, 948 (2007) (citations omitted). In International Association of 
Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City o{Boise City, 136 Idaho 162, 168, 30 P.3d 940, 946 
(2001), this Court wrote, "A court reviewing an arbitration clause will order arbitration 
unless 'it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 'Doubts are to be 
'resolved in favor of coverage.' In Firefighters, we held that whether the particular 
issue was arbitrable was to be determined by the arbitrators where the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate grievances, which were defined as involving the interpretation or 
application of their labor agreement, and "it cannot be said with 'positive assurance' 
that the ... dispute does not 'concern' the 'application and interpretation' of [the labor 
agreement]." 136 Idaho at 169, 30 P.3d at 947. 
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Whether the Trustee has complied with contract procedures that are conditions 
precedent to the arbitration of particular issues is to be determined by the arbitrators. 
Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 411-413, 224 P.3d 468, 478-
480 (2009) (italics added). 
Quite clearly, ITD's assertion that conditions prior to arbitration had not been satisfied 
was a question of procedural arbitrability - a question for the arbitrators. The District Court was 
correct. 
c) At the Time the Complaint Was Dismissed, Nothing Remained but a 
Question of Procedural Arbitrability. 
At hearing, ITD advised the District Court that nothing remained of its complaint but a 
question of procedural arbitrability: 
THE COURT: You would agree that with respect to the Complaint itself and the 
allegations, that there's no dispute, one, that there is an arbitration clause? 
MR. LUKE: Correct. 
THE COURT: Two, that the arbitration has been filed? 
MR. LUKE: Correct. 
THE COURT: Three, that there is another part of the contract by which you're 
relying on for your Complaint, which is that there must be certain conditions 
precedent, or there are certain conditions---and how well characterize those---but 
there's certain conditions that you allege prior to arbitration that must be met, 
namely, the review by the engineers? 
MR. LUKE: Agreed. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 17, L. 5-22). 
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While disagreeing with the interpretation of Storey Construction, ITD also agreed that, 
if Storey Construction makes it improper for the court to determine conditions precedent to 
arbitration, the Declaratory Judgment Statute would give the Court no basis for an "end-run." 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 19, L. 13 - p. 20, L. 7). 
In a carefully reasoned bench ruling, the District Court observed that " ... conditions 
precedent to arbitration are matters for the arbiter and not for the district courts to decide. 
Therefore, taking as true what plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint, nonetheless this court is 
without proper authority to get involved in this dispute. The dispute is one properly to be decided 
by the arbiters, and therefore the Motion to Dismiss is proper and I' 11 grant it." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
28, L. 20 p. 29, L. 6). 
The District Court followed established precedent based on the terms of the complaint 
and ITD's own admissions. The District Court was correct. 
3) ITD did not Move to Amend its Complaint in Any Respect, or to Plead a 
Cause of Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
ITD spearheads its appeal with an Administrative Procedures Act case, Laughy v. Idaho 
Transportation Department, 149 Idaho 867, 243 P.3d 1055 (2010). The case was not cited 
below, nor was there any citation below to a controlling administrative statute or IDAPA rule. It 
was not asse1ied below that the Administrative Procedures Act ("AP A") applied, and ITD did 
not seek to amend its contract-based Complaint to assert a cause of action under the AP A. 
Indeed, ITD represented to the District Court that the "administrative process" it relied on 
was "a creature of contract, rather than of statutory specification." (R., Vol. I, p. 000424). 
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Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (referencing Kinsela v. 
State, Dep't ofFinance, 117 Idaho 631, 634, 790 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1990)). 
Respectfully, ITD's proposed application of the Administrative Procedures Act on appeal 
is not crisply understood. 
Debco recognizes that " ... when an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief 
must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy must be exhausted before the 
courts will review the dispute." Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786 P .2d 
1136, 1138 (1990); (emphasis added); (citing Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 382, 383, 766 P.2d 
1262, 1264 (Ct.App. 1988)). Here, the complaint alleged that an administrative process was 
provided by contract. No applicable administrative statute or regulation was pled or cited below; 
indeed, ITD expressly disclaimed the applicability of any statutory administrative process. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 000424). 
In the context of the Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A") the legislature must 
empower the agency to "determine the particular issue" before a decision on that issue takes on 
the status of an "order". Laughy v. ldaho Transportation Department, 149 Idaho 867,871,243 
P.3d 1055, 1059 (2010). On appeal, ITD now asserts that (as with most all agencies) it has been 
granted the statutory right to enter into contracts under LC. Section 40-309, and that therefore the 
Legislature has empowered it to determine the particular issue of whether Debco is entitled to a 
contract price adjustment. (Appellant's Brief, p. 11). But the legislative-derived right to contract 
is not equivalent to a legislative empowerment of ITD to decide its own contract disputes in an 
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administrative process. Moreover, ITD's argument on appeal is directly contradicted by its 
acknowledgement below, that the administrative process in question was not a creature of 
statute. (R., Vol. I, p. 000424). 
Undeterred, ITD asserts that the legislature has granted it authority to prescribe "rules and 
regulations affecting state highway projects ... " as provided within LC. Section 40-312(1). 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12). ITD asserts that it adopted contract provisions pursuant to such 
authority. The same statute grants ITD rule-making authority for utility relocation, advertising 
structures and the like affecting highways. LC. Section 40-312(2)-(5). ITD has indeed 
implemented the authority of LC. Section 40-312 to adopt "Rules" related to such matters as 
Utilities On State Highway Right of Way (IDAPA 39.03.43), Outdoor Advertising (IDAPA 
39.03.60) and many others. (See generally IDAP A 39.03). 
Those administrative regulations which are set out within IDAP A are truly "Rules" 
within the definition of the AP A, for they were " ... promulgated in compliance with the 
provisions of this chapter. .. " LC. Section 67-5201(19). Rules properly promulgated are 
transmitted to the Department of Administration for publication in its bulletin, and if adopted, are 
recorded and published within Idaho's administrative code. I.C. Section 67-5202 through 67-
5204. 
However, the contract prov1s10ns utilized within ITD's Specifications are not so 
promulgated and are not contained within Idaho's administrative code, and are not "Rules" as 
defined within the AP A. As admitted by ITD below, the administrative process in question is 
merely a "creature of contract." (R., Vol. I, p. 000424). 
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As pled within ITD's complaint, and as represented to the District Court, ITD's 
specifications are just contract provisions which contain an arbitration clause. 
In entering into its contract with Debco, the Idaho Transportation Department " .. .laid 
aside its attributes as a sovereign, and bound itself substantially as one of its citizens does when 
he enters into a contract. Its contracts are interpreted as the contracts of individuals ... " Grant 
Construction Company v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 412-413, 443 P.2d 1005, 1009-1010 (1968), 
(quoting Carr v. State ex rel. Du Coetlosquet, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778, 779 (1891)). 
The AP A is inapplicable. This is a contract case. 
4) The Fee Award was Proper. 
Debco sought an award of fees under J.C. Section 12-120(3) noting that the Court 
(overruling prior decisions) recently confirmed that J.C. Section 12-120(3) and J.C. Section 12-
121 do apply to the State of Idaho as a litigant. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Department of 
Administration, 155 Idaho 55, 67,305 P.3d 499, 511 (2013). 
Further, in nearly identical circumstances, the Court granted attorney fees to a prevailing 
defendant " ... to compensate ... for attorney time incurred in compelling the arbitration." The 
Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582,586,226 P.3d 524, 528 (2010). 
ITD suggests here, and suggested below, that its suit was for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, and that an action to recover on a commercial transaction must be a suit to recover 
[money! on a commercial transaction. Not so. In an extensive sense, a "recovery" may include 
not just money, but " ... the restoration or vindication of a right existing in a person, by the fonnal 
judgment or decree of a competent court ... or the obtaining by such judgment, of some 
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right ... which had been taken or withheld ... " (Black's Law Dictionary, West Publishing 
Company, 5th Ed., 1979). 
Where, as here, declaratory and injunctive relief is sought under a commercial contract, 
the Court has confirmed that attorney fees are awardable under I.C. Section 12-120(3). 
Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423-424, 111 P.3d 100, 108-109 (2005). 
In Freiburger, the Court expressly rejected an argument that fees should not be awarded 
under I.C. Section 12-120(3) in a declaratory judgment action, and instead confirmed a District 
Court award of attorney fees under I.C. Section 12-120(3) where, as here, the suit sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce a covenant in a commercial contract. Freiburger, 
supra at 141 Idaho 423-424. "Thus, [w]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual 
relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of the 
statute." Id. (emphasis added). 
The District Court reasoned as follows: 
"Now looking at 12-120(3), it's quite clear to the court that this Court does have 
the authority to award attorney fees against the state in a case, based on 12-120(3) ... 
So then the question is does this case -is it one of a commercial transaction as 
envisioned under 12-120(3). And I think that this was an action brought to enforce the 
contractual rights of the parties under a contract, to declare those rights and to enforce 
them ... 
I think that the Frieburger case indicates that attorney's fees can be awarded in 
cases where equitable relief is sought rather than monetary relief and I think the Grease 
Spot case, clearly the implication of the Grease Spot case to the court is that a case in a 
commercial dispute to compel arbitration can support an award for attorney's fees. And 
it only follows that the reverse of that must be true; that is, that a dispute defended in an 
effort-defending an effort or defending against an effort to limit the arbitration rights of 
a party under a contract, likewise can result in and support an arbitration of attorney 
fees ... 
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So I think that 12-123 provides a basis for this type of action to award attorney 
fees. I do believe that what is at stake here, the gravamen of this matter, was a 
commercial transaction, and seeking the party's rights under a commercial transaction." 
(Amended Tr., Vol. I, p. 25, L. I through p. 26, L. 12; italics added.) 
Debco respectfully submits that fees below would have been appropriate under LC. 
Section 12-117 as well. Applicable authority there for is set out below. 
5) Debco Should be Awarded Fees and Costs On Appeal. 
a) Fees Under I.C. Section 12-120(3). 
For the forgoing reasons, Debco respectfully requests fees on appeal pursuant to LC. 
Section 12-120(3). 
b) Fees Under I.C. Section 12-117. 
Debco also respectfully also requests fees on appeal under LC. Section 12-117. A fee 
award is mandatory under LC. Section 12-117 where the state agency did not act with a 
reasonable basis in law. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 812, 172 
P.3d 1081, 1087 (2007); (overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 
906, 908, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012)). Lack of a reasonable basis in law has been found, for 
example, where the public agency has disregarded long established precedent. See, Reardon v. 
City ofBurley, 140 Idaho 115, 120, 90 P.3d 340, 345 (2004); (overruled on other grounds by 
City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,908,277 P.3d 353,355 (2012)). 
In this case, ITD not only disregarded the established precedent of the Storey 
Construction case, but has continued to do so long after the authority was revealed. All this was 
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done in the face of Debco' s complaint that ITD' s nonpayment of funds once acknowledged due 
was financially "breaking" the company. 
I.C. Section 12-117 provides a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes that agencies should never have made. Ralph 
Naylor Farms, supra at 144 Idaho 806. This objective is aptly served by a fee award in this 
dispute. 
c) Fees Under J.C. Section 12-121. 
Finally, and with earnest respect for opposing counsel, but with grave concern for actions 
urged by those in authority at ITD, Debco requests fees on appeal under I.C. Section 12-121. 
See, Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Department of Administration, 155 Idaho 55, 67, 305 
P.3d 499,511 (2013). 
Fees are requested in that this appeal was brought unreasonably and without foundation. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Debco's respectful concern goes well beyond the disregard of precedent 
related to procedural arbitrability questions. 
Specifically, ITD admitted to the District Court that the administrative claims process in 
question was a "creature of contract rather than of statutory specification." (R., Vol. I, p. 
000424). While ITD admitted below that it was "incorrect" to "suggest ITD is relying on a 
statutory administrative remedy process" (R., Vol. I, p. 000424), ITD now rests its appeal on the 
argument that a statutory administrative remedy exists; specifically: (a) that the statutory 
empowerment of the right to contract, is equivalent to statutory empowerment of the right to 
decide contract disputes under a legislatively authorized administrative process; and (b ), that the 
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contractual administrative claims provisions enjoy the same status as a properly promulgated 
IDAP A "Rules". (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12). ITD follows with an attempt to distinguish 
Storey Construction with the same argument; one that it had expressly disavowed below, to-wit: 
"as explained above, this is not merely a contractual condition precedent as that term is explained 
in Storey Construction." ( Appellant's Brief, p. 15, emphasis added). 
Respectfully, such actions by a governmental agency are not fair to the District Court, not 
fair to this Court, and most importantly, are fundamentally unfair to those such as Debco, who 
have no choice but to hope for fair play by governmental Departments such as ITD. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court, and award fees and costs on 
appeal to Respondent Debco. 
DATED this 1 I th day of September, 2014. 
BLEWETT MUSHLITZ, LLP 
By ________ -+--------
Ron T. Blewett, ISB No. 2963, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ASCORP, INC d/b/a DEBCO 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
cv oc 1321919 
Case No. 
) COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
) JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------) 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF Idaho Transportation Department (hereafter "ITD"), 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-902 and § 10-1201 et seq, and brings this cause of action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Ascorp, Inc. d/b/a Debco Construction 
(hereafter "Debco"). ITD hereby seeks to stay any arbitration unless and until Debco completes 
a contractually-required exhaustion of an administrative claims process. In support of this 
action, ITD complains and alleges as follows: 
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I. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff ITD is a State of Idaho governmental entity. ITD's obligations include 
overseeing and maintaining the state highway system. ITD also administers construction 
contracts for certain local road projects throughout Idaho. 
2. Defendant Debco is a corporation registered in Idaho as Ascorp, Inc. Defendant 
operates under the name Debco or Debco Construction. Debco' s registered agent and president 
is Lonnie E. Simpson. Debco does business in the State ofldaho. 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. · As explained further below, the Parties' contract specifies that disputes are to be 
heard in Boise, Idaho (the assumption is that these disputes would be addressed via arbitration, 
which would not proceed until after the exhaustion of an administrative claims process). 
4. As also explained in greater detail below, Defendant Debco has filed a demand 
for arbitration and, pursuant to the Parties' contract, has requested that such be heard in Boise, 
Idaho. 
5. Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act is found in Chapter 9 of Title 7, Idaho Code. 
Therein, section 7-918 provides as follows: 
r.c. § 7-918. 
Venue. An initial application shall be made to the court of the 
county in which the agreement provides the arbitration hearing 
shall be held or, if the hearing has been held, in the county in 
which it was held. . .. 
6. As an Idaho corporation doing business in Idaho, Debco is subject to this Court's 
jurisdiction. 
7. Venue is appropriate in Ada County pursuant to (i) the Parties' contract, (ii) 
Debco's demand for arbitration, and (iii) Idaho Code§ 7-918. 
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III. APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
8. Idaho Code§ 10-1201 provides as follows: 
LC. § 10-1201. 
Declaratory judgments authorized - Form and effect. Courts 
of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall 
be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or 
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or 
negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
9. Idaho Code§ 10-1203 provides as follows: 
Construction of contracts. -- A contract may be construed either 
before or after there has been a breach thereof. 
LC.§ 10-1203. 
10. Idaho Code§ 7-902(b) provides as follows: 
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding 
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement 
to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide 
dispute, shall be forthwith and. summarily tried and the stay 
ordered if found for the moving party. 
Idaho Code§ 7-902 (entitled "Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration"). 
IV. PARTIES' CONTRACT AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROVISIONS 
1 I. In May of 2010, Deb co submitted a proposal to ITD whereby Debco would 
reconstruct a portion of Washington Street in the City of Twin . Falls, Idaho (hereafter 
"Washington Street project"). Said proposal by Debco was in the form of a unit price bid in the 
amount of $6,531,483.40. A true and correct copy of the pricing proposal is attached as Exhibit 
A. The Washington Street project was to be a local road project administered by ITD. 
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12. On or about June 3, 2010, ITD and Debco entered into a contract for the 
Washington Street project. The contract is identified as ITD Contract No. 7418. Lonnie E. 
Simpson signed the contract on behalf of Debco. The contract incorporated Debco's unit price 
bid in the amount of $6,531,483.40. A true and correct copy of pages CA-1 and CA-2 are 
attached as Exhibit B (CA-2 is the signature page; CA-1 is the preceding page entitled 
"CONTRACT AGREEMENT"). 
13. The parties' contract also incorporates the 2004 Standard Specifications for 
Highway Construction. The Standard Specifications booklet is a sizeable document which 
addresses numerous aspects of contracting and construction. 
14. Of relevance for ITD's Complaint is Standard Specification 105.17. A true and 
correct copy of this provision is attached as Exhibit C. As can be seen, the provision is titled 
"Claims for Adjustment and Disputes," and it contains the following subheadings: 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS (page 33); 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (page 33); 
GENERAL (page 38); 
AUDITS (page 38); and 
BINDING ARBITRATION (page 40). 
15. Updates to the Standard Specifications are provided in a compilation of 
Supplemental Specifications, which are also incorporated into the Parties' contract. True and 
correct copies of the Supplemental Specifications Index and the specific, supplemented changes 
to Standard Specification 105.17 are attached as Exhibit D (the Supplemental Specifications are 
included to provide the complete contractual provision; the specific, supplemented changes to 
105.17 haye limited significance to ITD's present Complaint). 
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16. Standard Specification 105.17 provides ITD with the opportunity to r¢solve 
claims via an administrative claims process prior to being subjected to a binding arbitration 
proceeding, 
17. Under this provision, the administrative claim process begins with an ITD 
Resident Engineer who has 90 days after receipt of a documented claim to analyze and make a 
decision. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry on pages 33-37 of Exhibit C. Many claims 
are resolved at the Resident Engineer level. 
18. If a contractor is not satisfied, however, it may appeal a Resident Engineer's 
decision to ITD's Chief Engineer. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry at pages 37-38 
(Exhibit C), which requires a decision from the Chief Engineer within 90 days after the Chief 
Engineer receives a documented claim appeal. Again, many claims are resolved at the Chief 
Engineer level. 
19. If a contractor remains unsatisfied, however, it can then demand arbitration: 
If the Contractor is to make a demand for arbitration, it must be 
made within 120 days of the date of the Chief Engineer's decision, 
otherwise the Chief Engineer's decision shall be final and 
conclusive. 
See BINDING ARBITRATION entry at page 40 (Exhibit C, last paragraph). 
20. Arbitration is only available, however, after completion of the preceding 
administrative cl_aims process: 
The Contractor shall exhaust the Administrative Process for 
resolution, unless the Contractor and the Department agree that 
claims that have not been resolved through the Administrative 
Process provided in this section shall be resolved through binding 
arbitration. The Contractor and the Department may agree on an 
arbitration process, or, if the Contractor and the Department cannot 
agree, arbitration shall be administered through the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) using the following arbitration 
methods: 
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[References Expedited or Standard AAA provisions depending on 
the claim amount.] 
The Department and Contractor agree that any arbitration hearing 
shall be conducted in Boise, Idaho. 
The Contractor and the Department agree to be bound by the 
decision of the binding arbitration, and the judgment rendered by 
the arbitrator(s). The decision of the arbitrator(s) and the specific 
basis for the decision shall be in writing. The arbitrator( s) shall 
use the contract as a basis for the decision. 
Unless the Contractor and the Department agree, all unresolved 
claims and disputes which arise from the contract, must be brought 
in a single arbitration hearing. 
See BINDING ARBITRATION entry on page 40 (Exhibit C). 
21. Separate from the administrative claims process, the Standard Specifications 
allow the Parties to retain a technical expert to make non-binding recommendations. Further, the 
contract allows the Parties to potentially avoid a formal claim via a Dispute Resolution Board. 
The Dispute Resolution Board is also specified as being a non-binding process. 
V. DEBCO FILED AN ARBITRATION DEMAND 
ONE DAY AFTER SUBMITTING ITS CLAIM 
22. During the Washington Street project and thereafter, ITD has agreed to contract 
adjustments that increased the amount actually paid to Debco to approximately $8.4 million. 
23. Prior to October 28, 2013, the Parties were engaged in non-binding efforts to 
address Deb co' s additional payment adjustment requests ( over and above the approximately $1.9 
million that had already been provided in excess of Debco's unit price bid). These efforts 
included both a technical expert recommendation and an initial hearing before a Dispute 
Resolution Board. In accordance with the contract, ITD participated in good faith, but never 
agreed that either effort was anything but non-binding. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 6 000010 
24. Debco submitted its initial claim to ITD on October 28, 2013. A true and correct 
copy of the October 28, 201~ submission is attached as Exhibit E. This submission commenced 
the administrative claims review process. 
25. The very next day, October 29, 2013, Debco submitted a demand for arbitration to 
the American Arbitration Association (hereafter "AAA"). A true and correct copy of Debco's 
October 29, 2013 arbitration demand is attached as Exhibit F (please note: this is a large 
document with multiple appendices and its own exhibits). 
26. Debco's arbitration demand acknowledges that Debco has not exhausted the 
administrative claims process. 
27. ITD has not agreed to waive the administrative claims process; rather, ITD 
intends to proceed with the claims analysis as specified in the Parties' contract. 
VI. AAA IS PROCEEDING WITH ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE ARBITRATION 
28. ITD has objected to Debco's arbitration dem~d because Debco failed to exhaust 
the administrative claims process, and because ITD has not been given the opportunity to address 
and/or resolve claims prior to arbitration commencing (these are not necessarily the sole reasons 
for ITD's objection). 
29. To avoid any waiver pursuant to the AAA arbitration rules, ITD has formally 
made such objections to AAA. A true and correct copy of ITD's arbitration answer and 
accompanying motion is attached as Exhibit G (requesting that arbitration be held in abeyance 
unless and until Debco completes the administrative clail).ls review process). 
30. Despite ITD's objection, AAA has stated: "Absent mutual agreement or court 
order, the Association shall proceed with the administration of this matter." See AAA's 
November 22, 2013 e-mail attached as Exhibit H. 
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31. AAA has further indicated that it intends to assemble an arbitration panel, which 
means that ITD will immediately incur substantial costs (most potential panel members charge 
$280-$400 per hour, meaning a three-person panel would quickly incur thousands of dollars in 
expense). In an effort to avoid such expense, ITD will separately forward this Complaint to 
AAA with an additional request that AAA delay further action until this Court has ruled. 
32. Debco has opposed ITD's request to hold arbitration in abeyance. See e-mail 
from Debco's attorney attached as Exhibit I. 
33. Debco has further submitted a motion to AAA asking that an arbitration hearing 
be promptly scheduled. See Debco's December 2, 2013 motion attached as Exhibit J. 
34. Debco's and AAA's respective actions demonstrate that ITD will be engaged in 
full blown arbitration in the very near future absent this Court's intervention. 
VII. ARBITRATION SHOULD BE STAYED 
35. Debco has failed to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to demanding 
arbitration. 
36. ITD has been precluded from addressing and/or resolving formal claims prior to 
commencement of arbitration. 
3 7. ITD is entitled to ~JID~tJ;,xaYisiom pertaining to the administrative 
claims process. This is important for the present dispute, as well as for all other contract disputes 
that ITD might face in the future. 
38. Continuing with the arbitration prior to exhaustion of the administrative claims 
process would be inefficient and cause undue waste of public funds and resources. 
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39. Continuing with the arbitration prior to exhaustion would allow Debco to benefit 
from certain aspects of the contract that it likes (binding arbitration) while ignoring provisions 
that it finds inconvenient ( claims process). 
40. An arbitration stay would comply with the Parties' contract. Hence no harm 
would be caused to Debco because full blown arbitration would be available at the appropriate 
time. 
VIII. COUNT ONE 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
41. ITD here by incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint, as though 
fully set forth herein. 
42. Pursuant to I.R.C.P Rule 57 and Idaho Code § 10-1201 et seq, ITD requests that 
this Court issue a Declaratory Judgment in ITD's favor to·d~~~ intei;pretatmn 
~llmW!, and to enforce Debco's obligation to exhaust the .administnJ.ti\Te claims process 
pri9r to commencing arbitration. 
43. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1210, ITD requests that its reasonable costs incurred 
in bringing this Complaint be awarded to ITD. 
IX. COUNT TWO 
(Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction) 
44. ITD hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Complaint, as though 
fully set forth herein. 
45. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 65 and Idaho Code§ 7-902, ITD requests that this Court 
promptly issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin Debco and anyone acting on its behalf 
from prosecutirig its arbitration demand unless ·EW<l• until .Debco. complete$ ·the• ~ 
administrative claims process. 
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46. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 65 and Idaho Code§ 7-902, ITD requests that this Court 
subsequently issue an injunction to enjoin Debco and anyone acting on its behalf from 
prosectiting its arbitration demand unless and until Debco completes the contra~tual 
administrative claims process. 
4 7. ITD respectfully requests a prompt hearing to address its request for a temporary 
restraining order and/or an injunction. 
X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
W?EREFORE, PlaintiffITD prays for judgment against Defendant Debco as follows: 
1. . For a declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the contract's 
administrative claims process prior to pursuing arbitration. 
2. For a declaratory judgment ordering Debco to suspend the AAA arbitration unless 
and until Debco exhausts the administrative claims process. 
3. For a temporary restraining order to enjoin Debco from pursuing arbitration 
absent completion of the administrative claims process. 
4. For an injunction to enjoin Debco from pursuing arbitration absent completion of 
the administrative claims process. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate and proper. 
DATED this JQ_ day of December, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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